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The Impact of Market Ideology on
Transnational Contract Law
M. NEIL BROWNE*
JENNIFER COON**

I. INTRODUCTION

As world trade expands to the remotest of venues,
commercial laws that encompass transnational jurisdictions
become increasingly important. The appropriateness of these laws
rely, inter alia, on the strength of the assumptive base supporting
such transnational laws of commerce. As this article explains,
transnational contract law'is not the product of the Immaculate
Conception; it is the anachronistic progeny of certain European
laws that emerged during the Industrial Revolution. As such,
transnational contract law inherits many of the characteristics of its
progenitors. Those characteristics, however, become awkward
when viewed through a contemporary institutional context that
diverges from the prevailing social arrangements of the Industrial
Revolution.
This article focuses on one such taint, namely, that courts are
hindered in their ability to promote justice in international
contract disputes because of outdated assumptions they make
about typical markets. First, this article suggests a relationship
between assumptions about prevailing markets and the likelihood
that justice will emerge from contract law disputes. With that
linkage as background, this article then proceeds to lay out the
social and political conditions in Europe during the codification of
the West's most influential contract laws in England, France, and
Germany. These social and political conditions created the
° Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics, Emeritus and Senior Scholar, Bowling
Green State University
.. Research Associate, IMPACT Learning Community, Bowling Green State University
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foundational assumptions upon which these contract laws were
developed. This article then establishes a connection between
these assumptions and the substantive core of the world's
emerging lex mercatoria: the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts 2004 (UPICC), the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL),3 and the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

Once the connection between the formative assumptions of
western contract law and the emerging lex mercatoria are
established, this article will argue that the prevailing assumptions
of transnational commercial law threaten the ability of the courts

to promote justice. In particular, this article will focus on a
particularly salient illustration of capitalism's grip on commercial
1. Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International
Principles of ContractLaw, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 382 (2005) [hereinafter Lando, CISG
and Its Followers] (discussing the importance of the UPICC, PECL, and CISG as the
"troika" of modern international contract law).
2. INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT], PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004) [hereinafter UPICC]; Ole Lando,
A Vision of a Future World Contract Law, 37 UCC L. J. 2, 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter Lando,
Vision of a Future]. UNIDROIT published two editions of the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (UPICC). The first edition, published in 1994,
contained rules on formation, interpretation, content, performance, validity, performance,
and non-performance. The revisions to the UPICC made in 2004 included provisions
about third party rights, assignment of rights, transfer of obligations, assignments of
contracts, limitation periods, and substantive autonomy. The UPICC deals with
commercial contract disputes between parties of different nations when said parties
choose to abide by the UPICC. In such cases, UPICC is typically seen as neutral to the
interests of both parties.
3. Comm'n on European Contract Law, Introduction to the Principles of European
Contract
Law,
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission oneuiropeancontract law/
surveypecl.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) [hereinafter PECL] (discussing the history of
the Principles of European Contract Law). The members of the Commission on European
Contract Law published the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) in two sections.
Drafted in 1995, Parts I and II of PECL deal, inter alia with performance, nonperformance, and remedies. The principles previously published in Part I are included in
revised form published in 1999. Part III deals with plurality of parties, assignment of
claims, substitution of new debt, transfer of contract, set-off, prescription, illegality,
conditions and capitalization of interest. PECL concerns contractual disputes between
member states of the European Union.
4. COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

GOODS (CISG) 1-8 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 1998) [hereinafter
CISG COMMENTARY]. The 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) was ratified by the majority of the member countries of the European
Union (EU), as well as a total of seventy-one countries as of May 2007. Id. The CISG
deals with commercial contract disputes between nations all over the world. Id; see also
UNILEX, http://www.unilex.info (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (providing a web resource
and bibliography for the CSIG).
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law-standard form consumer contracts.5 The fairness of standard
form consumer contracts is especially contentious because the
standard forms imposed by the stipulator are not individually
negotiated and are typically sharply one-sided.6 Despite the
imbalanced basis for establishing the terms of the contract,
however, international courts still consider these contracts
generally enforceable because they promote the traditional
concept of justice imbued in western contract law.'
Finally and most significantly, this article identifies the flaws
in the typical justifications for enforcing form contracts. These
flaws will be shown by noting the difference between the kinds of
justice flowing from alternative assumptions about the nature of
power relationships in market exchange venues. Indeed, enforcing
form contracts is often justified by appeals to economic justice as
defined by the tenets of capitalism,8 not to a more robust version of
justice consistent with other legal realms.
II.

MARKETS AND JUSTICE

When discussing justice within market systems, scholars apply
many different, and sometimes conflicting, definitions to the word
"justice."9 Consequently, they also have trouble defining what
constitutes a "just" action within the market system.'" For example,
George Priest argues that markets can act as tools to advance
social justice by promoting equal opportunity and enabling
individuals to develop their talents." Priest criticizes the ideas of
Owen Fiss, who suggests that a norm of social equality, promoted
by social policies, is the best way to achieve social justice.'" Priest

5. Leone Niglia, The "Rules" Dilemma - The Court of Justice and the Regulation of
Standard Form Consumer Contracts in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125,125 n.1 (2006).
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part V.
8. Lando, C1SG and Its Followers, supra note 1, at 387.
9. See George L. Priest, Beyond Brown: Opportunity Versus Equality as an
Empowerment Norm: An Essay for Owen Fiss, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 347, 349 (2003); see
also JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Markets, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1461 (1994) (reviewing COLEMAN, supra).
10. Id.
11. Priest, supra note 9, at 357.
12. Id. at 352-55. Fiss has focused much of his writing on the equality norm, the
recognition of the moral and political equality of individuals, and legal cases and social
policies designed to end caste system. Priest argues that Fiss has now begun to "promote
solutions that extend beyond the equality norm of Brown and involve increased reliance
on the market," since part of Fiss's solution to the problem of poverty in urban ghettos
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asserts that the equality norm is not sufficient to achieve social
justice, and instead we should "[embrace] a norm of enhancing
opportunity... viewing the central ambition of the society as
creating the opportunity for individuals to more fully improve
their abilities."', 3 In fact, he argues that "[a]dopting the opportunity
norm.., compels a different understanding and interpretation of
the market than [Fiss] and others currently accept."'"
Priest believes that Fiss has a negative view of the market
because Fiss "[views] market activities, in contrast to politics or the
behavior of the government, as motivated principally by selfinterest."" As Priest explains, however, "most market activities
could be explained as readily as efforts to provide the best
products and services to fellow citizens."' 6 Priest further argues
that political activity can also be "motivated by self-interest," and
that wealth earned in the market can be used for many (implicitly
helpful) purposes."

In Priest's opinion, government solutions to advance social
justice have proven ineffectual in terms of equalizing opportunities
for economic success: "[B]lacks may have (roughly) equal access
to the same levels of schooling as whites, equal access to
employment, equal access to housing, and equal access to
government programs. But those forms of equality do not
guarantee equal incomes or equal success in economic life.""' He
argues that, to achieve social justice, we must adopt a norm of
equal opportunity that will help individuals achieve their full
potential, which in turn will translate into success in the market
system.' According to Priest, when markets have state-defined
rules that "allow individuals to make the best use of their talents,
they serve to implement social change. The market is the medium
was to move African American people to suburban areas, find jobs for them, and make
them market participants. Id. at 357.
13. Id. at 349.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 349-50.
18. Id. at 356.
19. Id. at 357. While allowing individuals to make the best use of their talents is
certainly an attractive idea, Priest does not explain what sorts of policies, programs,
actions, or methods would promote and enhance equal opportunity. He argues that equal
incomes and success are not guaranteed by equal schooling and access to employment, and
while this idea may not be without merit, he leaves open the question about how
opportunity is supposed to be equalized otherwise.
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through which individuals can improve their lives," and thereby
advance social justice.20
Neither Priest nor Fiss focus on the international perspective
of justice provided by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.2" Petersmann links
economic rights with market access to human rights and the fair
distribution of resources that enables people to achieve their full
potential 2 His form of international justice is concerned with
"non-discriminatory conditions of competition and.., equality of
opportunities among individuals 2and
peoples in economic markets
3
no less than in political markets.,
Presenting a slightly different view of justice and the market
system, Jules Coleman suggests that individuals have a basic and
instinctive urge to cooperate, not compete.24 In his view, "market
competition is a form of cooperative interaction to which we
2 resort
when the costs of social decision making become too high. 1
Competition under this cooperative theory, however, is not
without rules. Under the cooperative market model, markets are
constructed of rights and norms established by the community to2
indicate "acceptable and unacceptable ways of doing business. 1
When the norms are upset or individuals' rights are otherwise
disturbed, those individuals may experience a loss." Coleman
focuses on wrongful losses, specifically, those losses "accruing
from the infringement of a right or a loss that is someone's fault [as
a result of] that person's failure to observe some local norm of
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution
of InternationalMarkets, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 407, 410 (2003) ("From a human rights

perspective, international justice refers.., to human rights and democratic procedures
that justify the allocation and protection of equal basic rights, and the distribution of
scarce resources necessary for personal self-development of individuals.").
23. Id. at 415-16 (emphasis in original). Petersmann suggests that economic rights are
intimately connected to human rights and political justice: "Where respect for, and
protection of, human dignity are recognized as constitutional obligations of governments,
respect for the core of economic liberty rights and protection of social human rights to
satisfy basic needs ('distributive justice') can be interpreted as legal consequences of an
indivisible obligation to protect individual self-development in dignity." Id. at 421 (citing

the COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY (1998)).
24. See Waldron, supra note 9, at 1461 (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 61).
Coleman suggests that forming a market is a cooperative behavior since individuals must
first agree on principles such as property and property rights. See COLEMAN, supra note 9,
at 61.
25. Waldron, supra note 9. at 1461.
26. Id. at 1476 (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 330-60).
27. Id.
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market conduct."28 According to Coleman, the harm caused by

these wrongful losses must be reapportioned under a theory of
''corrective justice" to promote a just outcome.
Coleman defines "corrective justice" as a set of moral
principles "that [establish] connections between wrongful losses
and the agents responsible for them."29 He states that the person
who caused a wrongful loss has an obligation to repair that loss,
generally by compensating the person who experienced it." Such a

duty, according to Coleman, "is a matter of justice."3
Coleman bases his theory of corrective justice on the victim's
right to recover from the person who injured her.32 He admits that
under tort law this idea can appear unfair, as individuals may be
expected to pay a large amount of money because they were

careless for a second while driving." Coleman, however, suggests
that when considering corrective justice under tort theory, we must
forget about ideas of retributive justice under criminal law, which
focuses on punishment and the moral conduct of individuals. 4 He
argues that while "strict liability for the injurer seems unfair, strict

liability for his victim seems even worse.""
In his analysis of Coleman's ideas, Jeremy Waldron agrees
that building social stability through cooperation is one of the

primary reasons individuals use markets. 6 However, Waldron also
argues that Coleman is too quick to dismiss efficiency as another

main reason for market use." Waldron explains that under
28. Id.
29. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1476 (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 361-380).
30. Id. at 1467.
31. Id.
32. Id.'at 1480.
33. Id. at 1482.
34. Id. (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 222). Waldron argues that we must still
consider "connections that exist between the different domains of justice ... [and] the
possibility that there are overarching principles or intuitions of fairness.., that these
domains share in common and that entitle both corrective justice and retributive justice,
for example, to be regarded as forms of justice." Id. at 1483.
35. Id. at 1484 (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 223-25).
36. See id. at 1461.
37. Id. at 1466. Waldron and Coleman disagree on the primary reasons individuals
use markets. Coleman argues the main benefit of markets is not efficiency, but the fact
markets enable cooperation and social stability in diverse societies, since individuals can
trade without having to agree on all of their ideas and vales: "We use the values that we
do share to create and sustain a structure that enables us to cooperate with regard to
values that we do not share." Id. Waldron, however, suggests that social stability is only
part of the reason people use the markets, stating that markets "allow the simultaneous
pursuit of stability and economic efficiency" and "without markets we would have to
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Coleman's theories, markets, cooperation, and corrective justice
can all be linked:
[C]reating and sustaining a market is partly a matter of creating
and sustaining rights. To sustain a right is to ensure as far as
possible that the duties it generates are observed and to do
something about the situation when they are not... tort law,
understood as corrective justice, is a way of performing this last
task.38
In Coleman's view, corrective justice exists to guarantee the
mutually-agreed upon rights of individuals in a cooperative market
system.39
In contrast, Lily Chinn uses theories of environmental justice
to criticize markets, suggesting they are far more competitive than
cooperative and can work to the disadvantage of low-income
earners and minority groups."0 According to Chinn, "traditional
market-based approaches focus on efficiency by finding the least
costly solution to a problem. But economics often ignores
distributional fairness among participants in the market."'
Environmental justice, on the other hand, does not consider
efficiency to be a primary goal, focusing instead on "relieving lowincome and minority communities of environmental burdens
regardless of resulting higher costs to certain market participants
or society as a whole."42 She explains that environmental justice
"recognizes that race is a key factor in determining the distribution
of environmental burdens" and seeks "the fair treatment of people
of all races, income, and culture with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations and policies.""
Chinn also critiques the practice of emissions trading from an
environmental justice perspective." In an emissions trading
purchase stability by forgoing many interactions-exchanges, for example-that were
available in principle." Id. at 1467.
38. Id. at 1487.
39. Id. at 1489.
40. See generally Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An
EnvironmentalJustice Critiqueof Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999).
41. Id. at 83.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Id. at 85 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 59 C.F.R. 7629 (1994)). "Fair
treatment implies that no person or group of people should shoulder a disproportionate
share of the negative environmental impacts resulting from the execution of this country's
domestic and foreign policy programs." Id.
44. Id. at 88.
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scheme, the government establishes a limit for how much pollution
is allowed in a given area, and then sets limits for each factory or
facility in that area." If companies pollute at a level that does not
exceed their allowable limit, they can trade those "pollution
credits" on the market to companies that would otherwise exceed
their limit. 6 Chinn explains that because the factories that pollute
more tend to be located in areas with low-income and minority
populations,
those
"pollution
hot
spots..,
tend
to
disproportionately affect those communities."47 While those who
support market solutions suggest many people benefit from
emission trading because of the overall reduction in pollution,
Chinn argues that low-income earners and minorities should not
have to subsidize the rest of the population.48 Under Chinn's
definition of environmental justice, shifting the pollution burden
onto the backs of disadvantaged communities renders emissions
trading an unjust market interaction. "
James Murphy presents yet another version of the
relationship between markets and justice. His discussion of James
Gordley's defense of Scholastic jurists is a critique of the
Scholastics' emphasis on the value of goods rather than the
relationship between individuals when determining the justice of
market exchanges." According to Gordley, the Scholastics believe
that "justice in a voluntary exchange 'requires that parties
exchange performances of equal value.'"' "[T]his principle of
[equal value] is crucial for explaining why courts enforce some
kinds of agreements but not others and why courts interpret
contracts the way they do." 2 By focusing on the exchange, the
Scholastics emphasize the objects in the exchange rather than the

45. Id. at 88-89.
46. Id. at 89.
47. Id. at 96.
48. Id. at 82.
49. Id.
50. James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 Am. J. JURIS. 85, 86, 89 (2002);
James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981). Gordley follows
Scholastic jurists in the Aristotelian tradition and also cites Thomas Aquinas. Murphy,
supra, at 86-87.
51. Murphy, supra note 50, at 85 (quoting Gordley, supra note 50, at 1590).
52. Id. Yet while the Scholastics argue "'justice in exchange necessarily requires the
exchange of equivalents' ... they [also] acknowledge the many cases in which justice does
not require substantive fairness, as when gifts or distributions are mixed with exchanges."
Id. at 95-96.
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people. 3 This emphasis places importance on legal rather than
moral issues and directs courts to examine the value of the goods
and not the relationship between the parties when considering
exchanges and contracts.54 The Scholastics do, however,
acknowledge a relationship between moral and legal issues. The
Scholastics believe that while legal and moral evaluations are
different, the legal evaluation "must ultimately rest upon a sound
moral evaluation. ' ' Murphy, however, believes that the Scholastics place too
much of an emphasis on the value of the goods in a transaction
when they should be focusing on the relationships involved.
Although Murphy agrees that "equality is central to the justice of
voluntary exchanges," 6 he believes that equality of the parties, not
the goods, is what truly matters." According to Murphy, "[j]ustice
is a relationship first and foremost between persons, not between
things" and "equal market value of what is exchanged is [only] an
important manifestation ...of the respect each party owes to the
other."5 Accordingly, to have just exchanges, the parties must
respect each other and have equal bargaining power. 9
Murphy further argues the Scholastics misinterpreted
Aquinas and Aristotle's ideas about distributive justice, asserting
that those two philosophers understood property owners to be
stewards who had a responsibility to use their property to help
others in the community when needed.6" As Murphy understands
distributive justice, "[e]ach property owner is a kind of trustee who
has a duty of justice to ensure that his property meets the needs of
his fellow citizens."6 It would therefore "be unjust for the
government to claim sole responsibility for distributive justice, for
this would deny individuals and communities the right to exercise

53. Id. at 91.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 98.
57. Id. See also Chinn, supra note 40, at 81-84. Individuals such as Chinn who
advocate for environmental justice, also emphasize respect for parties outside of the actual
market exchange, and the importance of considering how they may be affected to
determine whether the exchange is just.
58. Murphy, supra note 50, at 98.
59. Id. at 100.
60. Id. at 113.
61. Id.
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their best judgment and creative initiative in deciding how their
wealth could best serve the common good."'62
Murphy's antagonism towards the Scholastic's position is
evidenced by the theory of the "just price." Because Gordley and
the Scholastics insist that a "just price" is the essence of fairness,
procedural unfairness, according to their position, should only be
an issue if substantive fairness is in doubt. 3 As Murphy describes,
"[h]ere we see a beautiful display of the logic of the just price: if
the essence of justice in exchange is the equal value of what is
exchanged, then that equality should be sufficient, in and of itself,
to secure the justice of the exchange."' Under this logic, it does
not matter if one person takes advantage of another as long as the
terms of the trade are fair."
Murphy, to the contrary, believes that "just price" can lead to
aberrant results. He argues, "a salesman might exercise improper
influence over his customers not only when he overcharges them
but also when he gets them to buy things that they really didn't
need." ' 6 Accordingly, Murphy argues, "some exchanges at unequal
market prices are morally justified while67 some exchanges at equal
market prices are not morally justified.,
What can we learn from these alternative conceptions of the
relationship between market activity and justice? Fiss,
Petersmann, Chinn, and Murphy emphasize power relationships
among individuals involved in a transaction as the sine qua non of
justice. In contrast, Priest and Coleman are primarily concerned
with fairness on the assumption that distributionalconcerns are of
minor importance. Priest and Coleman believe that distributional
differences are socially legitimate or, in the alternative, create
efficiency and personal responsibility, and are therefore more
significant than social equality in the sense of equal access to
markets or equal bargaining power during negotiations.
The remainder of this article assumes that a version of justice
that ignores bargaining power in markets reinforces the existing
power relationships among stakeholders in the markets. In that
62. Id.
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id. at 96-97.
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 96. Murphy argues it is reasonable to grant relief in instances that "involve
procedural unfairness, such as the buyer taking advantage of the ignorance or necessity of
the seller." Id.
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respect, such a version of justice represents a political position in
which power differences are preserved. Any version of justice that
justifies contemporary inequality and its effects is not worthy of
the name. Emerging patterns of legal development threaten to
confirm the view of some that globalization is but another way to
encourage the spread of international inequality. 68
III.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
MODERN CONTRACr LAW

English contract law was a late-bloomer, compared to the
contract law of other nations." While France and Germany both
developed forms of contract law in the Middle Ages, the beginning
of England's contract law did not appear until the sixteenth
century." This early form of English contract law took almost three
hundred years to blossom into the recognizable version of modern
contract law.71 A major stimulus to this development was the
Industrial Revolution."
By 1770, civil liberties, international free trade, textile
machines, and steam power moved England in a direction of
economic development that soon migrated to much of the Western
world." This era of economic development, now known as the
Industrial Revolution, saw a surge in economic transactions as
these concepts brought together people from across the globe." As

Statistics,
Globalization:
Data
and
World
Bank
Group,
68. The
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/data.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2008).
69. P.D.V. MARSH, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: ENGLAND, FRANCE,
GERMANY 1-21 (1994) (discussing the origins of European contract law). Marsh writes
that while both France and Germany developed their contract laws in the middle ages,
England did not develop its contract law until about the sixteenth century. Id. Thus,
England was about a half a century behind its European counterparts. Id.
•70. See id. at 18, 21. English law was, in a sense, inchoate and desultory in that it was
very new and it was not yet codified. It would not become codified until much later. Id.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Martin J. Doris, The Continued Resonance and Challenge of the "lus Commune"
in Modern European Contract Law, 34 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 391, 400-01 (2006)
(discussing how the industrial age of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a great
impact on modern contract law). Doris also notes that modern contract law was influenced
by laissez-faire economics. Id.
73. BERNARD GRUN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY: A HORIZONTAL LINKAGE OF
PEOPLE AND EVENTS 356-57 (1975). Grun's tables of events from that period show the
future impact of the industrial revolution in surrounding countries. This rippling effect
continues today.
74. MARSH, supra note 69, at 21.
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industrialization picked up momentum, formerly simple, quotidian
purchases became increasingly complex." The new complexities of
the market gave rise to a growing need for meticulously reasoned
legal principles, such as executory contracts,76 that were both
capable of navigating new intricacies in the law and durable
enough to protect business interests over time." The exchange of
ideas that resulted from grappling with these issues helped inspire
the first all-encompassing systematization of English contract law."
Codification of English contract law precipitated quite
quickly relative to its gestation. 9 As a result, the codified contract
law of that period incorporated the prevailing notion of justice at
the time,' which centered on an individual's freedom to act and
the responsibility attendant with such freedom. For example, "the
will theory,"81 which limits a court's role in mediating a contractual
dispute to establishing the intent of the parties and nothing more,
favors a system of justice based on individual responsibility, a
laissez-faire approach to regulating the conditions of the bargain
and universality. 2
The will theory promotes individual responsibility by making
the parties, not the court, responsible for the fairness of the
contract. 3 Each individual is responsible for ensuring that the
outcome of the contract is favorable to his or her own interests; the
court will not step in to save a party from its ill-advised bargain.
This limited role of the courts also reflects a laissez-faire approach
to regulating the conditions of the bargain.'
While individual responsibility, laissez-faireism, and
universality arose from the conditions inculcated by
industrialization, scholars made these ideas fashionable. Ironically,
the scholars most instrumental in developing the popular ideas
75. Id.
76. Id. An executory contract is a formal agreement to perform consensual promises
at a later date.
77. Id.
78. See id. Marsh claims that the systemization of commerce stimulated progress in
other areas, such as contract law. As trade increased and became more readily prevalent,
it forced contract law to evolve in order to stay apace.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 21-22.
81. Id. at 22. The will theory continues to hold sway in English common law. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Arguably, the will theory also supports the idea of universality of legal principles
because it asserts a course of action for all cases.
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during the age of machines were humanists. 5 The central goal of a
humanist is to further the interests of mankind.' To the thinkers of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, humanism meant
improving the human condition."
One of the most influential humanists was Thomas Paine,
whose 1791 publication The Rights of Man provided the
foundation for the modern conception of an individual's inherent
rights, or a priori desserts.' Paine opined that an individual is
naturally endowed with great personal sovereignty and that
centralized, political institutions function to repress those rights. 9
Only with minimal interference from the government can
humankind truly flourish.' Paine, like other prominent thinkers of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," emphasized laissezfaireism and personal responsibility as central to improving the
human condition.' It was also widely believed, however, that such
improvement only benefited the individual and not mankind in the
collective. It was not until Adam Smith that individuals' pursuits
were reconciled with the idea of the greater good. 3
In his monumental work The Wealth of Nations, Smith
asserted that individuals promote the well-being of society most
effectively when they selfishly pursue their own interests.4 He
85. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1791).
86. See generally David Taffel, Foreword to THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN
(Dover Publ'ns 1999) (1791).
87. See id.
88. See generally PAINE, supra note 85 (arguing that the natural state of man entitles
men to equal rights such as autonomy, liberty, property, security, and the pursuit of
property); see generally JOHN LOCKE, -AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Pomona Press 2007) (1690) (discussing the nature of man).
89. PAINE, supra note 85, pt. I.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 383 (Edward Alexander ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1999) (1859) (discussing Mill's proposal that individual consciences should be
free from the constraints imposed by society). Mill maintained that the government should
only have the right to interfere with the lives of citizens when they hurt one another. For
example, he thought the government had no reason to ban opium. See also LOCKE, supra
note 88 (elaborating that the "law of opinion" was just as important as the law of God and
the law of the state); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 57-88 (1992) (discussing the historical emergence of the public
sphere and how this influenced the values of that time period).
92. See generally PAINE, supra note 85, pt. I.
93. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Bantam Classics 1991) (1776).
94. Id. bk. I, ch. 2 ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."). According
to Smith's general thesis, voluntary, informed transaction always benefits both parties.
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argued that when two self-interested, rational people enter into a
bargain with each other, the transaction results in an equilibrium
of interests that maximizes the utility of each party.95 By optimally
advancing the interests of each party, the transaction yields the
ideal solution.' Because equilibrium is desirable, imposing
regulations risks doing more harm than good.97
Even when the equilibrium is somehow maintained despite
other parties' involvement, the transaction is less efficient than it
would have been had the other parties stayed out. 8 Because
interference with the market risks both inefficiency and inequality,
it follows that any use of regulation as an equalizing device is
counterproductive." As long as individuals are rational in their
decision-making processes, they are perfectly capable of
negotiating for the most advantageous terms.
Following this logic, if one party to a bargain were to become
severely disadvantaged as a result of a transaction, the
This idea was revolutionary because, in previous times, people saw bargains as a zero-sum
game. See also M. Neil Browne, Carrie Williamson & Garrett Coyle, The Shared
Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 431-39
(2006); JULIE A. NELSON, ECONOMICS FOR HUMANS 10-12 (2006).
95. SMITH, supra note 93, bk. I, ch. 2; see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, ETHICS OF
AMBIGUITY (Bernard Frechtman ed., Citadel Press 2000) (1947). Simone de Beauvoir
asserts that by choosing oneself, a person necessarily chooses others. This idea melds
social responsibility with individual responsibility by demonstrating that an individual's
choice necessarily affects other people.
96. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
97. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY,
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 11-43, 81-133 (1991) (discussing the "perversity thesis": in trying to
do good, one ends up doing harm). According to Hirschman, the perversity thesis is a
common rhetorical tactic that has been used since the eighteenth century to argue that the
government should not "interfere" with the social welfare. However, Hirschman writes
that this tactic is likely to be used for reasons other than "intrinsic truth value;" namely, it
is used to justify one's political views. While it is common sense that anything we do will
have good and bad effects, this argument focuses only on the bad effects and ignores the
positive things that have come from market regulation.
98. See Korobkin, supra note 96, at 1204-08.
99. SMITH, supranote 93, bk. IV, ch. 2; see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 97, at 81-133.
Another argument used against attempting to promote social welfare is what Hirschman
calls the "jeopardy thesis," which argues that the cost of the proposed change always
outweighs the benefits associated. In a sense, this argument is used by Smith to justify the
market process and promote the idea that quotas or fair trade agreements interfere with
the market. The market, here, is being used as the meta-issue, to which everyone must
bow. If the market collapses, so the theory goes, we are all worse off. Thus, any attempts
at changing the problems that arise because of the market are not worth the benefits that
could result, as any purported benefit would never help as many people as would the
unfettered market. Id.
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disadvantaged party would be wholly responsible for the outcome.
Not only is the individual responsible for pursuing his or her own
self-interest, he or she is also morally required to do so."- Any
failure to exercise his or her rights is the fault of either her
reasoning or her will,' and not that of the market."
Another essential element of Smith's classical economics, or,
for that matter, neo-classical economics," is its commitment to
universalism." Universalism is the idea that rules of human
behavior are nomological, that is, they apply regardless of context.
In this sense, economics embraces universalism as a way to
simplify the evaluation of transactions.
IV. CURRENT TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW AND CLASSICAL
ECONOMICS

The underpinnings of classical economics in modern English

contract

law

continue

to

manifest

themselves

today

in

transnational commercial contract law. To illustrate this point,
consider the following 2006 case from the Centro de Arbitraje de
M6xico, the Arbitrations Court of Mexico.

100. See SMITH, supra note 93, bk. I, ch. 2 (noting that the market will satisfy both
altruistic (benevolent) and egotistic (self-interest) goals).
101. This idea is also known as meritocracy. Michael Young coined the term
"meritocracy" in his book THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY (1958). Generally,
meritocracy is the idea that if one has talent and tries hard, he or she gets what she
deserves. Meritocracy ignores social factors such as wealth or formal education as playing
a role in desserts. As an interesting language note, in English we say we earn money. In
French, however, they do not earn money; they win money (ls gangent d'argent). This
suggests that meritocracy is perhaps an idea arising from social construction, rather than
human nature. See generally MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF MERITOCRACY (1958).

102. See Browne, Williamson & Coyle, supra note 94, at 440-41 (arguing that an
individual's failure to bargain for the best deal is her own fault, assuming that the market
is adequately competitive).
103. For the purposes of this article, neo-classical and classical economics can be used
almost interchangeably. See Economist.com, Economics A-Z, http://www.economist.com/
research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?term=neo-cassicaeconomics#neo-classicaleconomics
(last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (defining neo-classical economics as "the school of economics
that developed the free-market ideas of classical economics into a full-scale model of how
an economy works").
104. See Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the
Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM. Bus. L. J. 289, 289-94 (2002) (discussing the role of
universality for legal formalists in the late nineteenth century). According to Teeven,
"[tihis monistic urge for a unitary rule reflected a universal principle of enlightened
Western rational thought, since Francis Bacon, the English judge and scientifically-minded
philosopher, had resuscitated Plato's inductive ideas." Id.
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A distributor from the United States entered into a contract
with a Mexican vegetable grower who promised to exclusively
produce for the distributor a certain amount of squash and
cucumbers for a period of one year." When the grower failed to
supply the distributor with the promised goods, the distributor sent
the grower a letter of notice (with return receipt) giving him' °
fifteen days to perform his obligation under the agreement. 6
However, the grower failed to deliver any crops. The distributor
also discovered that in addition to not furnishing the produce, the
grower also violated the exclusivity clause in the contract. 7
In 2006, the distributor brought this matter before the Centro
de Arbitraje de M6xico, seeking (1) termination of the contract;
(2) damages sustained as a result of non-delivery; (3) payment of
contractually stipulated penalties for violating the exclusivity
clause; and (4) damages for the harm- done to the distributor's
reputation as a result of its failure to deliver the cucumbers and
squash to the markets in California. " Pursuant to the contract's
arbitration clause, the dispute was litigated in accordance with the
UPICC 9
The claimant argued that the defendant had breached the
contract by failing to supply the produce, while the defendant
argued that he could not provide the promised goods due to
unexpected forces beyond his control. The defendant blamed the
El Nifio effect... for the destruction of his crops."' The Centro de
Arbitraje de M6xico asserted that the occurrence of El Nifio did
not meet the criteria of a force majeure as defined in Article 7.1.7
(1) of the UPICC."2 The arbitral tribunal found that, given the

105. Breach of Contract Dispute (Mex. v. U.S.) (Centro de Arbitraje de Mexico 2006),
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1149&step=FullText.
106. Id. 3. Pursuant to Article 7.3.2 (1) of the UPICC, claimant sent defendant the
notice asking it to cure its breach. Without such notice, claimant cannot terminate the
contract for non-performance.
107. Id. 913, 6.
108. Id.
109. Id.
2, 3, 10.
110. See generally MADELEINE J. NASH, EL NigO: UNLOCKING THE SECRETS OF THE
MASTER WEATHER-MAKER (2002). Also known as the El Nifio-Southern oscillation, the
El Nifio effect refers to the temperature fluctuations in surface waters of mainly the
Eastern Pacific and Indian oceans. Among its effects are rainfall in normally dry areas
(with normally wet climates experiencing severe drought for an extended period of time)
and changes in air pressure.
111. Breach of Contract Dispute (Mex. v. U.S.) 9.
112. Id.
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nature of the El Nifio effect and the defendant's background in

agriculture, the consequences of such an occurrence were indeed
foreseeable.'13 The arbitration tribunal did concede, however, that
the El Nifio effect was beyond the grower's control. 4
The grower next argued that it should be exempt from the
consequences of non-performance due to hardship."5 According to
the arbitral tribunal, however, the claimant did not meet the
necessary criteria for such relief as outlined in Article 6.2.2 of the
UPICC."6 The court asserted that rainstorms and flooding are
some of the expected risks involved with growing vegetables in
Central America." Because the decimation of the grower's
cucumber and squash harvest resulted from risks known at the
time of conclusion of the contract, "the risk of [rainstorms and
floods] fundamentally altering the equilibrium of the contract
[should have been accounted for] by the disadvantaged party."..
The Centro de Arbitraje de M6xico sided with the claimant,
awarding him pecuniary damages."' The arbitral tribunal also held
the defendant liable for payment of the previously stipulated
penalty as compensation for violation of the exclusivity clause. 2 °
The arbitral tribunal, however, rejected the claimant's request for
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. 10.
116. UPICC, supra note 2, art. 6.2.2. According to Article 6.2.2, relief for hardship is
granted only "where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the
contract either because the cost of a party's performance has increased or because the
value of the performance a party receives has diminished, and:
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the
conclusion of the contract
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the
disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party and
(d) the risk of the event was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.
See also id. art 1.6(2). On a separate note, the wording of this article is somewhat peculiar
because it refers to altering the "equilibrium." The implication is that there is an
equilibrium to begin with that could be altered. Thus the assumption is that the exchange
benefits both parties equally. This wording sounds strangely like Smith's conception of a
bargain. See SMITH, supra note 93, bk. I, ch. 2.
117. Breach of Contract Dispute (Mex. v. U.S.).
118. Id. 9.
119. Id. The arbitral tribunal awarded pecuniary damage to the claimant because it had
provided sufficient proof as to the "amount, certainty and foreseeability [of the damages]
and its direct connection with the Defendant's failure to deliver, as required by Articles
7.4.2 (1), 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles." UPICC, supra note 2, arts. 7.4.2,
7.4.3, 7.4.4.
120. Breach of Contract Dispute (Mex. v. U.S.) 9.
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monetary restitution for sullying his reputation in the California
produce market.12 The arbitral tribunal found that the claimant
had failed to provide sufficient proof to substantiate the allegation
that his ability to sell produce in California in the future would be
significantly affected.'22
In summary, the claimant's petitions were sustained by the
arbitral tribunal because the defendant (1) was expected to have
reasonably foreseen the adverse weather conditions associated
with El Niflo and the effect it could have on his crops, (2) should
have anticipated the possibility of crop decimation in drafting the
contract, and (3) was at fault for not sufficiently preparing for this
possibility. The ruling of the Centro de Arbitraje de M6xico
demonstrates what a significant role individual responsibility plays
in determining fault in issues of transnational trade.
The importance of individual responsibility in transnational
contract law 23 is further evidenced by the UPICC, PECL, and
CISG. 24 Article 1.1 of UPICC and Article 1:102 of PECL both

stipulate that parties should be free to (1) enter into a contract;
and (2) determine its contents. 2'15 This meta-principle of freedom of
contract is also central to the CISG.1

6

By requiring contracting

parties to voluntarily enter into contracts and then (2) holding
them to the benefits and detriments of their bargains, the UPICC,
PECL, and CISG form a "troika" of international contract law

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. But see Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the
Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract Law in China, 40 AM. Bus. L. J. 459, 459-87
(2003) (discussing how the foundations of Chinese society, namely, "relationships,
reciprocity, and respect" shape how contact law is written and applied in China). The
uniqueness of individual responsibility in comparison to other systems is particularly
evident in looking at Chinese contract law. An important difference between China and
Western countries is that in China, the cogito is not "I think, therefore I am," but rather
"we think, therefore we are." Id. In essence, the individual is not concerned as much about
his own self-interest as he is concerned about the well being of the whole.
124. UPICC, supra note 2, arts. 3.2, 7.4.2. According to article 7.4.2 of the UPICC, had
the claimant provided sufficient proof of his alleged tarnished reputation resulting from
the transaction, he would have been entitled to those damages as well. Additionally, the
defendant claimed that the contract was not in fact valid because it had not been
registered with the Mexican authorities. The arbitral tribunal ruled that the contract was
valid because, as stipulated in article 3.2 of UPICC, the only requirement necessary for
validity of a contract is consensus between the parties. Breach of Contract Dispute (Mex.
v. U.S.) [ 4, 10.
125. UPICC, supra note 2, art. 1.1; PECL, supra note 3, art. 1:102.
126. CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 4, art. 6.
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that underscore the individual responsibility of each party. 121
Furthermore, as evidenced by the Centro de Arbitraje de Mexico
ruling above, such principles also require the parties to be rational.
As discussed in Section III above, the principles of capitalism
emphasize individual responsibility and rationality. Indeed, in
recognition of the capitalistic principles underlying the basic.tenets
of international contract law, a member of the Working Group for
the Preparation of the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles pointed out
that the wording of the UPICC and PECL articles noted above is
"clearly directed against the socialist economies, where the
exchange
of goods and services are governed by state plans and
8
, 2
orders.

1'

Transnational contract law similarly embraces the principle of
universality. The contextual variables of each case and their effect
on the degree of justice attached to a particular court decision are
presumed to serve as an ad hoc guide to jurisprudential
development. If courts of law do not maintain a relatively high
degree of consistency in making determinations of fault, contracts
will no longer be considered reliable methods of ensuring
performance. 121
Laissez-faireism, individual responsibility, and universality
are relatively unproblematic when applied to individual contracts.
The facts of a particular negotiation and market exchange do at
times reflect similar bargaining power and equivalent access to the
price and quantity negotiations. Yet, applying such principles en
masse to standard form consumer contracts reveals the flaws in
such "universalized" justice.
V. STANDARD FORM CONSUMER CONTRACTS

The advent of standard form contracts represents a
culmination of many values associated with market ideology."' A
127. Lando, CISG and Its Followers, supra note 1, at 382.
128. Id. at 387. For the list of the members of the Working Group for the Preparation
of the UNIDROIT Principles 1994 & 2004, UPICC, see PECL, supra note 3, at xix.
129. See generally Niglia, supra note 5; see also JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG,
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007) (discussing the impact individual cases have on
the integrity of the justice system).
130. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A
Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L REV. 1, 3-4 (2002). In

particular, the market ideology has blessed standard form consumer contracts with a
fictitious image of the consumer. By seeing the consumer as fundamentally rational, unfair
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standard form consumer contract is a compendium of terms.
prepared in advance by a stipulator (usually a firm) for acceptance
by an adhering party (a consumer)."' Standard form consumer
contracts are particularly advantageous to the stipulator because
they enable him or her to produce a large quantity of contracts in
one fell swoop, rather than conduct each contract on an individual
negotiated basis.'32
This approach to determining the terms of a prospective trade
can be advantageous to the consumer for a number of reasons. As
standard contracts allow the seller to reduce transaction costs
substantially, he is able to offer the product to the consumer at a
much lower price. In addition, the consumer does not have to
invest time in the contracting process, thus lowering the "real
price" (in contrast to the "nominal price"). "3 Standard form
consumer contracts are also beneficial to the consumer because, if
sellers were constrained to sell only to those with whom they had
individually contracted, goods and services would cease to be
easily accessible to the masses. Due to the modern market's
dependence on mass production as a means of making products
available to large numbers of people, standard form consumer
contracts are vital to the efficient operation of the global
marketplace."'
terms of a contract are permitted so long as the consumer has the option of whether or not
to enter into that contract. If the courts did not maintain this residue of market ideology,
however, a certain amount of policing would be required by both the courts and the
drafters to ensure the exclusion from the contract of terms that could severely
disadvantage one party to the contract.
131. Standard Form Consumer Contracts are sometimes referred to simply as
"standard form contracts" and also as "contracts of adhesion" (in that one party presents
the contract to the other party for acceptance with no opportunity for negotiation). See
Council Directive 93/13, art. 3.1, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC) [hereinafter Unfair Terms
Directive] (discussing the scope of the European Economic Community legislature as it
pertains to standard form consumer contracts); HIROSHI ODA, RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL
LAW § 8.2 (2002) (relating the standards of standard form contracts in the international
arena, specifically Russia); see also Niglia, supra note 5, at 125 n.1, 126 (discussing the
meaning of standard form consumer contracts and the problems associated with them).
132. Niglia, supra note 5, at 125 n.1.
133. The "nominal price" denotes the monetary price only, while the "real price"
represents the amount of the labor involved in purchasing the item and the amount of
money it costs to acquire the item. The "real price," as the name implies, is thought to be
more accurate. SMITH, supra note 93, bk. I, ch. 5.
134. Bates, supra note 130, at 3-4. Bates discusses other benefits afforded to the
consumer as a result of standard form contracts, including simplicity of transaction for the
consumer and the seller, efficiency of the internal organizational structure, and reduction
of economic barriers.
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In fulfilling their function, standard form consumer contracts
embody the values associated with market ideology by
emphasizing (1) individual responsibility, (2) laissez-faireism, and
(3) universality."' Individual responsibility is important to standard
form consumer contracts because only when the consumer has the
opportunity to accept or decline the contract is such a deal
considered legally enforceable.'36 Social legitimacy of the freedom
to contract depends on the existence of consumers who are
capable of choosing for themselves which contracts they should
sign; thus, standard form consumer contracts require reliance on
individual responsibility.
Laissez-faireism, the concept of abstention by government
from interfering in the free market, is critical to the continuation
of standard form consumer contracts. The utility of standard form
consumer contracts derives in part from its cost-reducing impact
on the negotiation process. Governmental regulation, whatever its
benefits, imposes costs on both parties to the bargain.
The adherence of standard form contracts to the principle of
universality is axiomatic.'37 The contracts are "standard" in the
sense that "one size fits all." No requirements to rethink or
recalculate the contract terms are present. Thus, standard form
contracts can be used for all types of transactions.
Despite their apparent benefits, standard form consumer
contracts, also known as small-print contracts, are widely seen as
detrimental to consumers.'38 As the stipulator is the sole drafter of
the terms of the contract, she can consign the bulk of the liabilities
onto the adhering party while exempting herself from any such
liabilities.'39 The stipulator can also force the consumer to imperil

135. See MARSH, supra note 69, at 22.
136. Korobkin, supra note 96, at 1204.
137. See Browne, Williamson & Coyle, supranote 94, and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1982); Robert Dugan, The Application of Substantive
Unconscionability to Standardized Contracts: A Systematic Approach, 18 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 77 (1982).
139. The terms "the adhering party" and "the stipulator" are borrowed from Ole
Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparison with
the UCC, 13 PACE INT'L L. Rev. 339, 357 (2001) (discussing how standard form consumer
contracts tend to be unbalanced). Lando writes that in standard form consumer contracts
the stipulator can: (1) require the adhering party to remain bound by the contract while
the stipulator can postpone, change or even cancel his performance; (2) impose penalties
to the adhering party in the case of breach of contract; and (3) absolve him or herself of
any liability in the case of breach of contract. Id.; see also Otto Sandrock & Nina Moore
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his or her assets beyond what the principle of proportionality
would require.'40 For example, cross-collateral security contracts
legally obligate the adhering party to relinquish all of his or her

assets for repossession in the case of default on the last ten
purchases made with the customer's credit card."' Even though the
punishment clearly does not fit the "crime" of defaulting on a

credit extension, the terms are admissible by law. "2
One reason standard form consumer contracts

are

problematic is that they are often lengthy and written in legal
language that is difficult for the ordinary consumer to

understand.'43 Because consumers do not want to invest the time
needed to read and comprehend the contract,'" often they only
look at a few points, if any, before signing. 5 Consumers,
businesses, and courts tend to be unified in the observation that
consumers do not read contracts.'46 If a consumer signs a standard
form contract, however, he or she is bound by law to all the
conditions under the duty-to-read provision. "7

Galston, The Standard Terms Act of 1976 of West Germany, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 551 (1978)
(discussing risks involved with- standard form consumer contracts in Germany and the.
international implications).
140. The principle of proportionality is the idea that the punishment should fit the
crime. In other words, the punishment should be proportional to the amount of damage
done. See Bates, supra note 130, at 4.
141. Id. at 4 n.6.
142. Id. at 2 (noting that when the law enforces the terms of the contract supplied by
the seller, it is, in effect, allowing the seller to reshape the law to its advantage).
143. Rakoff, supra note 138, at 1179.
144. See W. David Slawson. Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent
Deceptive Contractingby StandardForm, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 855 (2006); Wayne
Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contract.- In
Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 259 (2007); Melvin

Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243
(1995) ("Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the form taker knows he will find
difficult or impossible to fully understand, which involve risks that probably will never
mature, which are unlikely to be worth the cost of search and processing, and which
probably aren't subject to revision in any event, a rational form taker will typically decide
to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms."); Alan White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
Literacy and Contract,12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 242 (2006) (arguing that the root
problem with contracts is not that people simply do not read them, because even if
consumers did read contracts they could not understand them: "Actual assent is not just a
fiction because of voluntary choices by consumers; it is effectively impossible .... The law
is based on unfounded assumptions about the literacy of consumers and the readability of
contracts and disclosure forms.").
145. See Barnes, supra note 144, at 237.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 245-46; see also Slawson, supra note 144, at 856-57.
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While the basic logic of the duty-to-read provision is clear," it
gives the corporation a distinct advantage. Business owners realize
consumers examine price, not complex contract terms, when
making a purchase, motivating corporations to include terms that
are unduly beneficial to the company. ' Because companies write
the standard form contracts, they are able to consult lawyers and
draft contracts with full knowledge of their legal implications,
while the average consumer is unlikely to be able to understand
the meaning or legal implications of a standard form contract, even
if she takes the time to read it. 5'
These criticisms and perceptions have not greatly restricted
the use of such contracts."' Arguments about market efficiency
and its subsequent effect on the kind of justice that ignores the
power relationships framing a take-it-or-leave-it bargain seem to
trump concerns about the disproportionate influence of the
contract creator on the terms of the trade. As Charles Pouncy
explains, however, "when market principles serve as moral
indicators, the result is oversimplification and obstruction of
economic justice rather than a promotion of it."'52 In response to
148. Barnes, supra note 144, at 245-46.
149. See Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract,29 MELB. U. L.
REV. 179, 194-95 (2005).
150. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract,42 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 25
(1984) ("[It is] generally impossible to state in a writing all the legal implications that arise
from a transaction, given the short time the parties can generally afford to spend in
reading and understanding the document."); Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 243 (arguing
that the party designing the form contract will use that same form again and again, and as
such, will spend a good deal of time and money on the form to make sure the contract
works to their advantage); Barnes, supra note 144, at 265 ("The entire onus has been
placed on consumers... the duty-to-read rule permits merchants to pack their standard
form contracts with one-sided terms, and it is thus at least ostensibly reasonable to hold
that the consumer is bound by those terms when she signs.").
151. Barnes, supra note 144, at 272.
152. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Economic Justice and Economic Theory: Limiting the Reach
of Neoclassical Ideology, 14 J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 11-28 (2002) (asserting that economic
justice is often, if not matter-of-factly, ignored in cases where classical economic theory
plays a key role in interpreting or drafting the law). Pouncy contends that economic justice
is fundamentally incompatible with neoclassical economic theory because economic justice
requires, among other things, an unbiased interpretation of the law, and classical
economics is inherently biased. The biases of classical economic theory are particularly
apparent in cases where groups bargain with individuals. Because classical economics
explains groups merely as aggregates of individuals, having the same, essential qualities,
significant complexities that may influence the bargain are oversimplified. In particular, a
pretext of classical economics is that inequalities of bargaining power are generally
nonexistent because the bargaining power among individuals is essentially the same. As a
result, instances where inequality of bargaining power brings about unfairness are often
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the perceived unfairness of standard form consumer contracts, a
number of countries have drafted laws to ensure a greater degree
of consumer protection and enhanced equality in bargaining
power.
VI. REGULATORY RECGONITION THAT BARGAINING POWER
MATTERS

Perhaps'the most aggressive consumer protectionist law
meant to combat the perceived unfairness of standard form
consumer contracts is Germany's Act Co ncerning the Regulation
of the Law of Standard Contract Terms (AGBG).'54 Enacted in
1976, the AGBG seeks to construct roadblocks for stipulators who
try to place undue burden on the consumer in standard form
consumer contracts.'' The roadblocks are promulgated in the form
of the "black list" and the "gray list." Section 11 of the AGBG
includes a "black list," enumerating the conditions that render56
terms legally unenforceable as contravening consumer rights.'
Alternatively, Section 10 of the AGBG includes the aptly named
"gray list," which sets forth the "suspicious" conditions that may
render terms unenforceable, but are not necessarily legally
unenforceable. 7
Even with mandatory safeguards in place, such as Sections 10
and 11 of the AGBG, consumers still face many obstacles to
protecting their interests. For example, in order to remove the
effects of unfair terms in a contract, parties would have to take
considered fair because the choices of the weaker party are construed as the fault of that
party.
153. Some of the laws that came about to amend the problems for consumers with
standard form consumer contracts include: The Act Prohibiting Improper Contract Terms
(ICT), Sweden; The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), United States; The Unfair
Contract Terms Act of 1977 (UCTA), United Kingdom; The Laws Governing General
Conditions of Business Act (AGBG), West Germany; and The Israeli Standard Contracts
Law of 1964 (SCL), Israel. See Bates, supra note 130, at 44-90.
154. See Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen
[AGBG] [Act Concerning the Regulation of the Law of Standard Contract Terms], Dec.
9, 1976, amended June 29, 2000, BGBL. The standards of fairness of the AGBG were
eventually integrated into the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch on January 1, 2002, at section 242.
See 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
283 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987); see also Sandrock & Galston,
supra note 139, at 559.
155. Bates, supra note 130, at 55-56.
156. Id. at 62.
157. Id. Both lists apply only to consumer contracts. Sandrock & Galston, supra note
139, at 562; see also Lando, CISG and Its Followers,supra note 1, at 358.
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their claim to court. Only consumers that have suffered the
consequences of unfair terms, however, would have reason to take
legal action. Therefore, many contracts containing unfair terms
will never go before a judge. In addition, because litigation is
costly and an inconvenient means to recovery, fighting the terms of
18
an unfair contract may not be worth the cost it imposes.
Even when parties go to court and receive exemptions from
unfair terms, a court victory is only applicable to the individual
consumer. The award won by a wronged consumer would have
little to no effect on consumers impacted by similar unfair terms.
Although victory in an individual action may strengthen a future
case concerning the same type of unfair exchange, this case-bycase approach to the problem understandably prevents numerous
justifiable claims from ever being adjudicated. Thus, there is little
reason for stipulators to pay attention to either the black or the
gray list when so few injured parties actually petition the courts.
One potentially significant effect of consumer protection laws
stems from their demonstrative effect-jurisdictions observe a
consumer protection law in another jurisdiction, promoting the
movement of local laws in a similar direction. For example, on
April 5, 1993, the terms of the AGBG were embraced by the
European Union (EU) in the European Community (EC)
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Directive),"'
although with some slight modification.6 '
158.
159.

Lando, Vision of a Future,supra note 2, at 4-6.
Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 131, Annex (for the gray list of terms deemed

possibly unfair; PECL, supra note 3, art. 4:110 (for reference to terms deemed unfair); see
also Lando, Vision of a Future, supra note 2, at 4-6; UPICC, supra note 2, art. 2.20. To
some extent, the principles of the directive were also adopted by UPICC. Per the

comments to Article 3.10, the UPICC gives courts the power to render unenforceable:
1. grossly unfair liabilities on the part of the consumer
2. grossly excessive penalties on the part of the consumer

3. terms that give the stipulator an "excessive advantage
4. grossly unfair standard term
5. subsequent events have altered the original "equilibrium" of the contract
Furthermore, Article 3.10 of UPICC requires that the abuse of the superior bargaining
power of one party is relevant to the concrete case. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of
Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the UNIDROIT 'Restatement' and Danish Law, 46

AM. J. CoMp. L. 485, 500 (1998) (discussing how deeming some terms of, in particular,
standard form commercial contracts as unfair a priori serves as a means of perhaps
unfairly policing international commercial contracts).
160. Of the modifications made to the AGBG, the ECJ decided that there should be

no black list of terms deemed to be unfair per se; all "unfair" terms, black or gray, were
seen as "gray" by the ECJ. See Case C-237/02, Freigburger Kommunalbauten v.
Hofstetter, E.C.R. 1-3403 (2004).
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It should be noted, however, that a recent interpretation of
the Directive has undermined the law's intended consumer
protectionism in favor of market competition. 6 ' In lieu of
automatically invalidating terms that impose grossly undue
burdens or other disadvantageous terms on the Adhering Party
(the consumer),162 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) adopted a
circumstantial test that uses the particular circumstances of the
case as the res gestae to determine fairness."'
Freiburgeris illustrative of this interpretive shift." On May 5,
2007, a municipal construction company in Germany sold Mr. and
Mrs. Hofstetter a parking spot by way of a notary contract.16' The

parking spot was to be located in a city parking garage that had yet

to be constructed. 66 As stipulated in Article 5 of the contract, the

entirety of the purchase price of the parking spot was to be paid to
the contractor (the municipal construction company) upon the
delivery of a bank guarantee insuring the Hofstetters against nonperformance.67 The Hofstetters were furnished with the bank

guarantee about two weeks after the conclusion of the contract, at
which time they refused to make payment. 16 They insisted that,

according to Paragraph 9 of the AGBG, they were not required to
pay remittance until they had inspected the parking spot
themselves to ensure its quality. 9 Approximately seven months
after the conclusion of the contract, payment was finally made to
the contractor, at which time the construction company filed suit
against the Hofstetters for default interest due to their late
payment.
The Landgericht Freiburg (Freiburg Regional Court) ruled in
favor of the plaintiff, ordering default interest to be paid. 7 The
appeal, brought before the Oberlandesgericht Karlruhe (Karlruhe
Higher Regional Court), ruled in favor of the defendant, finding
161. See Niglia, supranote 5, at 145.
162. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 131, at Annex (for the "gray list" of the
seventeen terms of standard form consumer contracts that are considered unfair).
163. Freiburger, I 22, 25 (2004); see also Niglia, supra note 5, at 131-40 (discussing
Freiburgeras it relates to the valuation of market principles).
164. Freiburger,1 22, 25.
165. Id. 9.
166. Id.
167. Id.
10-11.
168. Id. 1 12.
169. Id. See also AGBG, supra note 154, 1 9.
170. Freiburger,91
13.
171. Id. 1 13.
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that, because the term contained in Article 5 was unfair as
established in the AGBG, interest for late payment was not due. 72
The construction company appealed the ruling and the case
proceeded to the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court). 73
The German Supreme Court ruled that, because Article 5 of the
contract stipulated that if the entirety of the purchase price was
not received at the time of delivery of the security (the bank
guarantee), the purchaser would be liable for default interest, and
the contracting company had a legal right 174to default interest
regardless of terms that may be seen as unfair.
However, because the German Supreme Court questioned its
decision in conformity -with laws of the European Union,1 7 it
referred this question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:
Is a term, contained in a seller's standard business conditions,
which provides that the purchaser of a building which is to be
constructed is to pay the total price for that building,
irrespective of whether there has been any progress in the
construction, provided that the seller has previously provided
him with a guarantee from a credit institution securing any
monetary claims the purchaser may have in respect of defective
performance or non-performance of the contract, to be
regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Council
Directive 93/13/EEC1 6 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in
1
consumer contracts?
By referring a domestic dispute for a preliminary ruling to the
ECJ, -the Bundesgerichtshof demonstrated its desire to render
rulings consistent with those of the EU.17 Although the rules
contained in PECL, wherein lies the Directive, are considered
"soft law" because they are not legally binding in any country,08
they are important to the cohesion of the EU nation states. Thus,
those states that wish to show their desire to function as a part of a
greater community will use the ECJ's ruling in this case to

172. Id. 1$113-14.
173. Id. 14.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Niglia, supra note 5, at 139.
178. See, e.g., Lando, CISG and Its Followers, supra note 1, at 382. Hard law, on the
contrary, is law for which compliance is not optional.
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influence future judgments. 79' This ruling will therefore most likely
have a ripple effect in other EU countries.
In response to the Bundesgerichtshof's question, the Court
concluded that the Annex 4 of the Directive did not make the
terms of Article 5 of the contract per se unfair." The Court ruled
that the question of unfairness is a matter for the national court to
determine based on the particular circumstances in the case.'81 The
construction company and the plaintiff, Freiburger, asserted that
any disadvantage resulting from the term in question was offset by
the advantage of a lower price."' The contractor stipulated to
"early" payment as a way of reducing the interest that would be
incurred during the construction of the parking garage and the
Hofstetter's parking spot. "3 Freiburger argued that by avoiding this
interest, the contractor was able to offer the Hofstetters a reduced
price for their purchase." However, because they failed to make
payment at the time of delivery of the bank guarantee, the
contractor was forced to incur the interest himself.' As a result,
the price he had offered the Hofstetters was no longer fair, and the
Hofstetters should be liable for the interest the contractor paid as
a result of their breach.'8
The plaintiffs argued that the security of the bank guarantee
minimized the risks consigned to the Hofsetters because it
protected them against non-performance, and to a certain extent,
defective performance.'87 In rendering its decision, the Court
thereby sidestepped compliance with the Annex of the Directive
by maintaining that the Annex was non-exhaustive,'88 and should
consequently not be construed as indicative of per se unfairness.
Thus, the Court suggested that the contract might be permissible
even though Article 5 contained a term. that violated Sections (o)
and (b) of the Annex of the Directive.98
179. Id.
180. See Freiburger,$ 23-25.
181. Id.
2-3.
182. Id. $ 16.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. 1 12-13.
186. Id. 116.
187. Id.
188. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, E.C.R. 1-4147, 20 (2002).
189. Freiburger, 23-24.
190. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 131, at Annex. The Annex of the Directive
contains all of the terms that may be deemed unfair by the Commission. The two terms
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Consequently, the Court's preliminary ruling established that
while the terms listed in the Annex of the Directive could be
perceived as unfair, the Annex does not make them necessarily
unfair.'91 In other words, the possibility of considering a term unfair
does not presume that the underlying transaction is unfair. If the
overall deal is not unfair, there should be no substantive reason to
object to a particular term. As such, the fairness of the overall deal
is the only significant factor to be considered when adjudicating
fairness.
According to this logic, even though the Court seemed to
agree with the defendants that the term found in Article 5 of the
contract was unfair when viewed alone, it suggested that the term
might not be unfair when used in this particular contract because
of its relationship to the overall deal.'" In drawing this conclusion,
the Court referred to its previous judgments.'93 It pointed out that
because the term of disadvantage to the consumer was balanced by
terms that favored the consumer, namely the security deposit and
the reduced price of construction, the overall deal may be
considered by the national court as fair. In support, the Court cited
the Opinion of the Advocate General indicating that the Court
should not rule on the application of "general criteria" to a
particular term.9 Thus, the Court essentially suggested that certain
terms deemed "unfair" by the Directive did not afford the
Hofstetters the same level of legal protection, which might be
considered appropriate in prior cases, when the term is considered
in light of the entire contract.

said to be violated in the Freiburgercase were articles (o) and (b). Article (o) reads,
"obliging the consumer to fulfill all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not
perform his"; and article (b) reads, "inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights
of the consumer vis-d-vis the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or
partial non-performance or inadequate .performance by the seller or supplier of any of the
contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or
supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him." Freiburger,T[17.
191. Id. T[20.
192. Id. T 21.
193. Id. 23. The Court referred to the ECJ joint rulings in Oc~ano which determined
that a term drafted in advance by the seller "satisfies all the criteria enabling it to be
classed as unfair for the purposes of the Directive." If the purpose of the term is to confer
jurisdiction for any dispute that arises under the contract, however, "[the term] must be
regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive in so far as it causes,
contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer." Joined Cases C240-244/98, Oc6ano Grupo Editorial v. Quintero, 2000 E.C.R. 1-4941, 21-24 (2000).
194. Freiburger,T 22.
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Freiburger is significant because it represents the extent to
which the triad of values promulgated by economic liberalism
shapes interpretation of the law, even when the letter of the law
erects safeguards against it. This subversion of prior legislation,
case law, and traditional methods of making judgments points
towards a laissez-faire attitude about power distribution and
consequent effects on bargaining power."'
Nonetheless, in important respects, the result of the attempts
at deregulation demonstrated by Freiburger, undercuts the very
principles used to justify it.'96 In particular, the ECJ's clash of
values is apparent in three respects: (1) the circumstantial test, (2)
the disregard for case law, statutes, and legal scholarship, and (3)
the regard for the overall deal in the context of the circumstantial
test.
As Leone Niglia points out, Freiburgersignifies a "shift away"
from rule-bound logic to judicial discretion.97 This shift is perhaps
most visible in the ECJ's circumstantial test enunciated in
99 The circumstantial test posits that in judging the
Freiburger.
fairness of a term, it is necessary to broaden the focus to observe
the context in which the term is employed.'99 The test disfavors
bright-line rules that define particular terms as per se unfair.
Instead, courts are encouraged to evaluate the fairness of terms as
they relate to the "nature of the goods and services for which the
contract was concluded."200
The circumstantial test is therefore used to legitimate suspect
terms in standard form consumer contracts. As a result, consumers
who suffer from disadvantages caused by standard form consumer
contracts are less likely to seek legal intervention. Without a clear,
comprehensible picture of what is necessary for "unfair" terms of a

195. See generally Niglia, supra note 5 (discussing how Freiburgerrepresents a drastic
change in how cases are decided).
196. Several authors have discussed principles that seek to justify market ideology. See
generally Korobkin, supra note 96, at 1204-08 (discussing efficiency); Browne, Williamson
& Coyle, supra note 94 (discussing universality); SMITH, supra note 93 (discussing
individual responsibility); NELSON, supra note 94, at 10-12 (discussing the rational and
self-interested consumer); YOUNG, supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing
meritocracy).
197. Niglia, supra note 5, at 135, 145-46.
198. Freiburger, 21.
199. Niglia, supra note 5, at 128.
200. Freiburger,1 21.
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contract to be invalidated, it signals to consumers that litigation
2011
may not be worth pursuing.
At the same time, by contending that fairness is based on
individual context, the ECJ arguably promotes justification for
consumer protectionist terms. For example, the events and
circumstances surrounding one transaction may be inapplicable to
a second market exchange. 22 Thus, the logic used to substantiate
the test also serves as a rationale for opposing universality in the
sense that one market price is as legitimate as the next. 3
By disregarding the list of unfair terms as provided in the
Annex of the Directive and the case law that supports the
defendant's petition the Court takes power away from the many
and gives it to the few. The result is to centralize, rather than to
decentralize, power. In economics, decentralization of power is the
key to establishing respect for market outcomes. If power is
centralized, individuals do not have the ability to pursue their own
best interests, and markets cannot achieve the utility maximization
touted by market advocates.
. It is equally problematic to view' contractual fairness as a
function of the overall bargain, as opposed to evaluating specific
terms contained therein. The list of unfair terms within the Annex
of the Directive seeks to protect, among other things, basic human
rights. When the Court rules that these rights can be taken away
if they are balanced by other favorable terms,2"6 the Court implies
that such rights are not unconditional, but are subject to the whim
of a judicial tribunal.
The intentions of the Commission in endorsing the Directive
are clear from the communications of its members in 1993, prior to

201. For the risks involved with pursuing litigation, see Case C-478/99, Comm'n v.
Sweden, E.C.R. 1-4147, IT 12, 14 (2002).
202. See generally Niglia, supra note 5.
203. See SMITH, supra note 93, at 52 (discussing universality); see also Browne,
Williamson & Coyle, supra note 94 (discussing democratic ideas in economics).
204. Freiburger, 21.
205. For example, Section (q) protects against the limiting or exclusion of the right of
the consumer to take legal action. Also, Section (p) protects against "giving the seller or
supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under the contract, where
this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter's agreement."
These and other parts of the Annex of the Directive protect what are considered
fundamental rights. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 131, at Annex.
206. Freiburger, 16.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:91

the enactment date."7 According to the Commission, protectionist
rules (such as those contained in the Annex of the Directive) have
the potential to restrict "economic freedom and leads to the risk of
higher unemployment following price rises, or to loss of
competitiveness."" Thus, the Commission clearly voices support
for a form of justice that ignores bargaining power relationships.
Demand and supply curves are therefore ipso facto socially
acceptable expressions of resource value.
It can be argued that the Freiburger case shows a great
willingness on the part of courts to place market principles above
any form of justice that is grounded in equal opportunity or
positive freedom. The case dramatically represents the extent to
which classical liberal support for market outcomes will go in
shaping judicial reasoning, even when such reasoning is
inconsistent with previous legislation and case law,2" and even
when such a perspective is potentially self-contradictory.21
VII. CONCLUSION

Contract law becomes a global concern when international
trade burgeons. If we assume that consumers are rational,"' and if
we assume that consumers have significantly similar bargaining
power vis-A-vis those who produce and market products, then it
follows that the individuals who sign contracts should be held
responsible for honoring the terms of their bargain. It is only fair

207. Commission Communication, Unfair Terms in Contracts Concluded with
Consumers, at 7, EC Bull., supp. 1/84, based on COM (84) 55 final (Feb. 14, 1984).
208. Id.
209. See Freiburger, 23. It should be noted, however, that the court does its best to
distinguishprior case law, rather than making a radical departure.
210. Niglia, supranote 5, at 137-42.
211. Cf. Korobkin, supra note 96, at 1203-09 (arguing that humans are not infinitely
rational, as Smith would have us believe, but rather, they are boundedly rational).
Korobkin proposes that consumers choose what to buy not based on all of the complex
qualities of the product and its accompanying standard form consumer contract, but based
only on its "salient" features. Salient feature are those qualities that are most important to
the consumer-such as price and visible qualities. By this account, it is in the best interest
of the seller to satisfy only the visible and superficial features of a product. The seller has
little incentive to assist the consumer in discovering attributes the consumer would like to
know. For example, it does not make sense for a manufacturer of teen clothing,
specializing in cheap and stylish clothes, to make garments out of cashmere or to spend
hours meticulously sewing lining into the skirts or pants. Even though those qualities are
the sign of well-made clothing, they are not the qualities that the consumer will look for
before making a purchase. More likely, the clothing's salient features are (1) its degree of
stylishness and (2) its degree of affordability. Id.
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that they not make a commercial promise one day, and then
decide tomorrow that they prefer another set of price, quantity or
quality specifications. Yet, support for justice based on market
outcomes, without examining the social relationships that
encouraged, permitted, and shaped those outcomes, ignores the
external factors that shape the self. Hence, support for a justice
that ignores the distributional structure that resulted in those
outcomes strips the individual of his character, turning him into a
"cog," or, as Nietzsche would say, creating an exterior without a
corresponding interior.212
Fort and Schipani suggest a "tri-partite model" that would
result in a more robust version of justice, one that honors market
principles once they have been adjusted to create a more level
playing field at the point of the negotiated exchange of goods and
services."' Their vision of justice internalizes and respects three
fundamental human values: (1) economization-creating something
useful from raw materials; (2) power-aggrandizement-developing
status and maximizing freedom; and (3) ecologization-forming a
web of social cohesion."' "These steps," they write, "would allow
for the efficiency of markets to discipline corporations while
preserving the moral goods of human lives lived in such
corporations. 2 .5 These three principles would create a sharply
different lex mercatoria from that shaped by classical liberalism's
attitude toward optimal resource allocation."6

NIETZSCHE,
ON THE ADVANTAGE AND
212. See generally FRIEDRICH
DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE (Hackett Publishing Company 1980) (1874).

Nietzsche writes that the accumulation of knowledge without experience makes one
develop an interior without a corresponding exterior in the sense that one's identity is
based solely in his immaterial, mental processes, without having any sense of oneself in the
physical world. Nietzsche sees this as detrimental in that it prevents one from engaging in
one's own life. By making a person a cog in the machine, with no complex qualities, one
effectually loses any sort of immaterial self and his existence is defined merely by his
physical qualities. Id.
213. See generally TIMOTHY L. FORT & CINDY A. SCHIPANI, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS
IN FOSTERING PEACEFUL SOCIETIES (2004).
214. TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING
INSTITUTION 111-15 (2001).
215. Id. at 115.
216. See Browne, Williamson & Coyle, supra note 94, at 435. Using the economists'
dogma to decide matters of law is dangerous: "When assumptions are made in legal
reasoning about consumer sovereignty without evidence as to the market structure, the
social legitimacy of 'the market' should be strongly questioned." Id. Thus, it seems out of
place that the courts should make rulings dependent on particular market conditions that
can later be used to decide cases where the market conditions are different. For this
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Contemporary transnational contract law is especially nonresponsive to the ecologization prong in the Fort/Schipani model.
For example, the toleration of standard form consumer contracts
tilts the distribution of bargaining power away from the individual
consumer because terms are not negotiated on an individual basis.
By restoring the dialogue between consumers and sellers, the
relationship between them would be validated as a partnership,
rather than as a relationship analogous to that of lord and serf.
Under the partnership model, sellers would be required to respect
consumers, and vice versa. Fort and Schipani write, "in the 1980s
revival of civic republicanism, scholars have argued that the
commitment to dialogue was a central tool to transform selfinterested individuals into citizens concerned with the common
good."2 '7 If consumers and sellers could see their relationships as
promoting a common good, their bargaining would reflect both
social and individual needs. Were courts to focus on the social
dynamics of a bargain, they would be more likely to satisfy an
egalitarian, rather than a crude utilitarian, conception of justice."8
Transnational contract law is based on ideas popular during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: individual responsibility,
laissez-faireism, and universality. Individual responsibility leads to
the pursuit of one's own self-interest; laissez-faireism leads to the
ability to promote one's interests; and universality suggests that
the pursuit of one's self-interests leads to the fulfillment of the
interests of others. Ultimately, as this article demonstrates, the
resulting "justice" is a selective justice.

reason, deciding cases according to market ideology runs the risk of being inefficient or
not morally justifiable.
217. FORT& SCHIPANI, supra note 213, at 129.
218. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Arthur
Goldhammer ed., Penguin Books 2004) (1835) (discussing the problems with utilitarian
forms of justice).

